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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
October Term, 1981
JIM McNEFF, INC.,
a California Corporation,
Petitioner,
VS.
FRANK L. TODD, et al,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW AS
AMICUS CURIAE
The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review as amicus curiae respect-
fully submits this brief in support of Frank L. Todd, respondent. The
Loyola Law Review urges this Court to affirm the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Todd v. Jim
McANeff, Inc., 667 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1982). Consent to the filing of this
Brief has been received from counsel for both the petitioner and the
respondent and has been filed with the Clerk of this Court.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review's interest in filing this
brief lies in encouraging students as well as members of the bar to con-
tribute in the development of labor relations and employment law.
Todd v. Jim McNeff, Inc. came to the Law Review's attention as
part of the Law Review's annual Ninth Circuit Labor Law Survey.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The split among the circuits on section 8(f) prehire agreement enforce-
ability brought to light in the McNeff decision sparked the Law Re-
view's desire to express itself on the issue. This brief provides the
opportunity for that expression.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prehire agreement wage and benefit provisions need to be en-
forced: a construction industry employer must know his labor costs; an
employee must know his basic terms of employment. Once signed,
prehire agreement wage and benefit terms should be enforced until
NLRB election result certification.
The filing of a section 9(c) or (e) representation petition should not
by itself disrupt the enforceability of prehire wage and benefit terms.
The courts provide the proper enforcement forum.
ARGUMENT
1. SECTION 8(f) PREHIRE AGREEMENT WAGE AND BENE-
FIT TERMS ARE ENFORCEABLE FROM AGREEMENT IN-
CEPTION UNTIL NLRB ELECTION RESULT
CERTIFICATION.
A. Section 8() Legislative History Callsfor Enforceable Wage and
Benft Provisions.
Wage and benefit provisions are fundamental to the employment
relationship. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d
Cir. 1965). In the construction industry, reaching early agreement on
wage and benefit terms is of particular importance. Moreover, the con-
struction industry employer needs to know his labor costs before he can
bid accurately. Congress recognized the particular concerns of the con-
struction industry when it authorized prehire agreements: "One reason
for this practice is that it is necessary for the employer to know his
labor costs before making the estimate upon which his bid will be
based. A second reason is that the employer must be able to have
available a supply of skilled craftsmen ready for quick referral." Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, Sen. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(hereinafter cited as "Sen. Rep."), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, at 424 (1959) (hereinafter cited as "Leg. Hist."); see NLRB v. Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 348 (1978).
Thus, prehire agreements were permitted in order to facilitate ac-
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curate bidding practices by employers and a ready access to union hir-
ing halls. If prehire agreements were to be held unenforceable ab
initio, then neither of the two legislative goals would be met. The
union could unilaterally cut off access to hiring halls and wage costs
could fluctuate resulting in inaccurate bids.
Without the enforcement of wage and benefit terms of a prehire
agreement, construction industry employees cannot know from one day
to the next what they will be paid or to what benefits they are entitled.
Section 8(f) allows a union and employer to reach agreement on wage
and benefit terms essential to the bargaining relationship. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f) (1976). The congressional policy underlying section 8(-) sup-
ports the enforceability of those terms.
B. Iron Workers supports judicial enforceability of prehire wage
and benefit terms.
The Court, in NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978), de-
scribed the prehire contract as "'a preliminary step that contemplates
further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship.'"
434 U.S. at 345 (quoting Ruttmann Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701,
702 (1971)). The Court noted that "when the union successfully seeks
majority support the prehire agreement attains the status of a collective
bargaining agreement executed by the employer with a union repre-
senting a majority of the employees in the unit." Id at 350.
The singular nature of the construction industry was addressed by
Congress: "The occasional nature of the employment relationship
makes this industry markedly different from manufacturing and other
types of enterprise. An individual employee typically works for many
employers and for none of them continuously. Jobs are frequently of
short duration, depending upon various states of construction." Sen.
Rep. at 27, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318,
2344, and in Leg. Hist. at 423. Thus, "[rlepresentation elections in a
large segment of the industry are not feasible to demonstrate. . . ma-
jority status due to the short periods of actual employment by specific
employers." 434 U.S. at 349 (quoting Leg. Hist. at 541-42). Accord-
ingly, some consideration should be given to the stability of wage and
benefit rights of the employees in the prehire agreement context.
The ability to enter into a voluntary prehire agreement with an
employer does not grant the union the privileges of a majority repre-
sentative. 434 U.S. at 352. A prehire agreement does not attain the
status of a collective bargaining agreement subject to 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976) until the union demonstrates majority status. Id at
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349-50. Thus, a prehire agreement is something less than a collective
bargaining agreement enforceable through the unfair labor procedures.
Id A prehire agreement is, however, something more than a nullity; it
represents a voluntary contract whereby both parties obtain both the
benefits and burdens of the limited relationship created under section
8(f) of the statute.
Iron Workers held that picketing to enforce a prehire contract vio-
lates section 8(b)(7). Id at 352. Section 8(b)(7) prohibits picketing to
force an employer "to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as
the representative of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7). Con-
cerned with the employees' freedom to choose their bargaining repre-
sentative, the Court emphasized the voluntary nature of section 8(f)
contracts: "Congress was careful to make its intention clear that
prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily. . . ." 434 U.S. at
348 n. 10. Iron Workers does not address the situation where no picket-
ing occurs and the parties voluntarily agree to honor wage and benefit
provisions.
Iron Workers prohibits picketing to enforce prehire contracts. Iron
Workers does not prohibit the enforcement of prehire agreements
which were voluntarily agreed upon by the union and the employer.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider those aspects of the employ-
ment relationship which best meet the underlying purposes of section
8(f) and enforce those provisions.
C. A Section 9 Election Petition ShouldNot Disrupt Prehire Agree-
ment Wage and Benefit Enforceability.
Ordinarily, a current collective bargaining agreement acts as a bar
to any challenge regarding the majority status of a union. Pioneer Inn
Associates v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978). Under section 8(f),
however, a union's majority status may be called into question at any
time: "[A]ny agreement which would be invalid but for clause (1) of
this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section
159(c) or 159(e) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(f). Section 8(f), however,
is limited by its language to permitting a challenge to a union's major-
ity status through the filing of a representation petition with the Board.
A finding that the filing of a section 9 petition renders a prehire
contract unenforceable would create a period between election petition
filing and NLRB election certification during which the parties to the
agreement could not rely on bargained for wage and benefit terms.
The effect of this would be that employees would not be assured of
agreed upon wages; employers could not rely on access to union hiring
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halls; employees would not be assured of medical and other benefit
coverage; and employee trusts would not know whether to provide em-
ployee benefit coverage. Such a hiatus could create labor instability
and jobsite unrest. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 630 (1975).
In Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944), the Court up-
held a NLRB order requiring an employer to bargain with a union
which had lost majority support during a seven-month interval be-
tween the union's filing of unfair labor practice charges and the Board's
issuance of a complaint based on those charges. The Court refused to
allow the employer to disregard its bargaining commitment during the
seven-month interval even though the union had lost employee sup-
port. The Court noted that:
[Riefusal of an employer to bargain collectively. . . disrupts
the employees' morale, deters their organizational activities,
and discourages their membership in unions.
[A] bargaining relationship once rightfully established must
be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in
which it can be given a fair chance to succeed. Id at 704-05.
The Court in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), held that an
employer's belief that his employees had deserted their certified union
did not justify the employer's refusal to bargain with the union. As in
Frank Bros., the Court found the employer's duty to bargain with the
union continued at least until Board review: "If an employer has
doubts about his duty to continue bargaining, it is his responsibility to
petition the Board for relief, while continuing to bargain in good faith
at least until the Board has given some indication that his claim has
merit." Id. at 103. The Court noted that to allow an employer to re-
fuse to bargain because an employer questions a union's majority status
would undercut the "underlying purpose [of] . . . industrial peace."
Id
Frank Bros. and Brooks support uninterrupted enforceability of
prehire wage and benefit provisions. The Court in these cases recog-
nized the importance of stability in labor relations. A prehire contract
provides such stability in the construction industry. The filing of a sec-
tion 9(c) or (e) representation petition requests an election. Enforce-
ment should continue until that election is held.
Should this Court determine that a more definite time period for
enforcement of a prehire agreement is desirable, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4)
provides an alternative.
19831
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Although a Board election is readily available under section 8(f)
through the procedures set forth in sections 9(c) and (e), if no election
petition is filed, a prehire agreement could be voluntarily enforced by
an employer and a minority union indefinitely. Trust Fund v. McDow-
ell, 103 LRRM 2219 (1979), illustrates this problem. In McDowell, the
employer paid benefits to the union trust funds pursuant to the provi-
sions of a minority prehire agreement for almost ten years. Id at 2220.
The employer repudiated the agreement and it was held to be unen-
forceable. Id
Although Congress intended prehire agreements to apply to the
short term employment situation in the construction industry, never-
theless, there should be some mechanism that would permit stability if
all parties to the agreement (employees, the union, and the employer)
so desired, and that would provide a structured termination procedure
should any of the affected parties become disenchanted with the provi-
sions of the prehire agreement or representation by the particular sig-
natory union.
Section 158(d)(4) imposes a sixty day notice period to terminate or
modify a collective bargaining agreement during which time the agree-
ment "continues in full force and effect." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4). In
Eastern District Council v. Blake Construction Co., 457 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Va. 1978), the district court held that a prehire contract did not
terminate until sixty days following notice of intent to terminate. The
court reasoned that "[b]orrowing from the notice provision of § 8(d) of
the Labor Act, the contract was terminated at the conclusion of the
sixtieth day following that date [of termination], through which time
damages continued to accrue." Id at 831.
The Blake court applied the sixty day notice provision to all col-
lective bargaining agreements, regardless of their method of creation.
Id at 829. Under Blake, the union's majority status can be raised at
any time by the filing of a representation petition under section 9(c) or
(e) of the statute. The effect of the election petition would be to start
the section 158(d) sixty day time period. The prehire agreement would
continue in full force for up to sixty days. The parties to the agreement
would be assured of constant wage and benefit enforceability for at
least sixty days, during which time an election could be held. Because
-final decisions on representation petitions are usually made by the
Board within sixty days of the petition filing date, a hiatus would likely
not occur. 45th Annual Rep. of NLRB for Fiscal Year 1980, page 15,
Chart No. 10 (e.g., mean time for final decisions from date of petition
in 1980 was thirty-eight days).
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The benefit of adopting the sixty day enforcement period under
section 158(d) would be to assure employees of wage and benefit provi-
sions called for under the agreement, the union would have the obliga-
tion to pursue majority status in a timely fashion for those sites which
remain under construction for a sufficiently long time to permit repre-
sentation proceedings, and the employer would enjoy stable labor costs
and continued access to a skilled labor force.
II. COURT ENFORCEMENT OF PREHIRE WAGE AND BENE-
FIT TERMS IS PROPER.
A. Section 301 authorizes judicial enforcement ofprehire wage and
benet terms.
Section 301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits "for vio-
lation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce. . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978). This Court in Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods,
369 U.S. 17 (1962) held that section 8(f) contracts fall within section
301's language.
Since the Court's decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), it has been settled that section 301 does more than
confer jurisdiction: "[I]t authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agree-
ments. . . ." Lincoln Mills at 451. Lincoln Mills instructs the federal
courts to fashion enforcement "from the policy of our national labor
law." Id at 456. The Court recognized that while the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act provides federal courts with some substantive law,
not all statutory mandates offer substantive guidance. Id Federal
courts can nevertheless provide for enforcement:
Some [statutory mandates] will lack express statutory sanc-
tions but be solved by looking at the policy of the legislature
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. Id
at 457.
[I]t is far too late in the day to deny that Congress intended
the federal courts to enjoy wideranging authority to enforce
labor contracts under § 301. Plumbers & Pioeftters v. Plumb-
ers and Pipeftters, Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 627 (1981)
Section 8(f) legislative policy calls for prehire wage and benefit
provisions which are binding until NLRB election certification and
which are enforceable in the federal courts. Lions Dry Goods gives the
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courts jurisdiction to resolve section 8(f) disputes. Lincoln Mills gives
the courts the power to order section 8(f) agreement enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Section 8(f)'s express language only authorizes prehire agreements.
Section 8(f) legislative history, however, suggests that Congress passed
it with enforceability in mind. Congress left the substance of enforce-
ment to the federal courts.
A prehire agreement is not a complete collective-bargaining agree-
ment; it becomes complete when the union attains majority status. A
prehire agreement, however, should have enforceable wage and benefit
provisions. All prehire terms may not be enforceable because the
prehire contract is a collective bargaining agreement of limited dura-
tion, entered into without benefit of union majority status. Yet fairness
demands that the agreement should have force. Enforcement of the
wage and benefit provisions of a prehire agreement until NLRB elec-
tion result certification strikes an appropriate balance of interests be-
tween the parties and is within the congressional intent behind section
8(f).
Respectfully submitted,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW
REVIEW
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